For the first week of December 1985 the crash on Wall Street and the question of what had caused it preoccupied the American press and indeed the world financial community to the exclusion of all else. Only the White House seemed to remain somewhat aloof after President Reagan had appointed a prestigious commission of enquiry, under the championship of an ex-secretary of the treasury, to determine what had caused the sudden slump on Wall Street.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡuPQr2ouzn0
The fact was that Reagan was preoccupied with the African situation and his secret negotiations with the Soviets on this topic, which he regarded as potentially the most important contribution of his presidency to the peace of the world. When several members of his Cabinet had argued that issues in the Persian Gulf, Poland, and Central America deserved more of his attention, his response was to rebuke them for their lack of perspective: "We will lose even more if we cannot protect the strategic mineral wealth and vital ports of South Africa and its neighbors. Both are threatened by the black fanatics, most of them communists, and undermined by the white zealots; we must relieve that pressure by restraining South Africa---in their own best interests---or by fighting all of Black Africa. I have chosen to restrain the South Africans."
During November the negotiations were kept top secret, but Reagan was always aware that, ultimately, carrying American public opinion was vital to his success. When the operation did become public the White House public relations machine went into overdrive. Such a flood of information was made available to the media, with day-long personal briefings given to select journalists, including the screening of parts of the video-tape that recorded for posterity the long night's vigil of December 9-0, that this episode is perhaps the best documented event in all U.S. foreign policy. A 1st-class investigative reporter from the Washington Post covered the story from its beginning and had planned a definitive article for the first Sunday of 1986. The story was overtaken by events and it was not published, but it provides the basis for the following:428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡTfgI3mNCBO
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On a cold November morning in Berlin an old, black Mercedes was allowed to pass quickly from East to West through Checkpoint Charlie. In the car, simply but effectively disguised, was Nikolai Tikhonov, Chairman of the KGB. He was on his way to a secret and historic meeting in West Berlin. His waiting host was William Casey, Director of the CIA. Against the background of the developing Africa-West conflict---and because of it--their purpose was to explore the prospects for join US-Soviet action in Africa.
Two weeks before, Casey had sent an urgent communication--"Eyes Only" for the President---to the White House. It was a preliminary response to Reagan's request for a strategy to bring about an African settlement while the USSR was in an accommodating mood:
"For nearly two decades successive US administrations have allowed South Africa to frustrate and sabotage all efforts to bring about a compromise or a comprehensive settlement of the Apartheid controversy.
"For the same number of years, and supported more often than not by the professionals in the State Department, this Agency has consistently warned that a failure to compel South Africa to end Apartheid would lead to the defeat and collapse of black modernization---with catastrophic consequences for the security and economic well-being of the US and her European allies.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡgpk0K4KxIk
"This Agency is now in possession of evidence which strongly suggests that the black moderates, including the chairman of the African National Congress and his colleagues in the official black leadership, have run out of time to prove their supporters that polices and compromise can get results; and that they are within months, maybe weeks, of having to abandon their search for a political and compromise settlement---or be overthrown by an alliance of radicals and communist fundamentalists that may prove too hot for Moscow to handle. If the moderates in South Africa fall, that country will become a flashpoint in the Africa-West conflict--and that could put an end to any hope of containing it.
"As you have said yourself, the time has come from the US to compel South Africa to end Apartheid. I have formulated some ideas, which should be discussed as soon as possible. A caution: if word of any intended US action leaks before we are ready, we can be sure that the South Africans will stop at nothing to blackmail us into backing off."
Within one hour of receiving the letter President Reagan had called Casey and asked him to come to the Oval Office at noon the following day. Casey spent most of the intervening hours studying the briefing book he had personally compiled and labeled "The New Pretoria."
Though his letter to President Reagan did no more than hint at it, the main concern of the CIA, and some of the State Department, was to isolate the white-black issue from the Africa-West conflict. The South African government was trying to defend itself as the staunch ally of the West against Africa---represented in this instance by the moderate African states of Burundi, Malawi, Botswana, Uganda, Zaire and Congo. The State Department and the CIA were determined to expose this for the myth that it was, because they saw that if these moderates were overthrown, as Pretoria seemed to wish, a good deal of Africa would be taken over by Marxist regimes and other radicals who regarded America as evil. This would be a disaster for America, but as Casey and his colleagues knew, it would be as much of a disaster for that old South Africa which had been close in spirit to America and the West as a whole.
It was essential that the black moderates be kept in power, and that could only done if they were able to deliver something concrete to the black majority in South Africa. But nothing could be delivered without pressure on the whites to allow it, and that pressure must come from the United States. Could any department chief stimulate the needed political will in President Reagan to undertake so risky a venture?
For it was very risky. Presidents from Eisenhower to Carter had funked standing up to the domestic white majority in America with its power over votes and even more over funds. But now a president must also face South Africa's constantly implied threat to use her overwhelming military superiority to humiliate the blacks (and America) if Washington made demands unacceptable to Pretoria. And in the back of the collective mind of the White House through these years was the ultimate threat, always referred to as Armageddon, that if South Africa were pushed too far she would finally leap into a nuclear holocaust of her own making, potentially carrying the whole world with her.
The plain truth was that American presidents were scared of what South Africa might do to protect her white population. And with good reason. According to the CIA's best guess, South Africa now had between 450 and 500 nuclear warheads. And hanks partly to her cooperation with Israel, France and South Korea she had a variety of delivery systems. The F-4E Phantom, the Mystere-4, the Super Etendard and the Israeli-made Kfir C2 were all fighters capable of delivering the bomb.
To Casey's surprise Reagan was relaxed and calm when they met, apparently ready to confront South Africa. As Casey was shortly to learn, there was a good reason for this positive approach. Reagan was later to refer to it as "my secret weapon."428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡ7Uef8Kxr8n
During his opening remarks President Reagan suggested that he still needed to be convinced that a South African withdrawal from Namibia would not pose an unmanageable military threat to South African's security and existence. Casey knew the President was, in fact, well briefed on the reasons why an independent Namibia could not and would not pose a credible threat to South Africa; and he judged that what Reagan was really seeking was final assurance before agreeing to a major initiative. For that reason Casey confined his reply to the fundamentals.
A condition of the formation of a new African nation (in a coalition government with Botswana) was that it was possess only a lightly armored internal police and security force which, by definition, could pose no threat to South Africa.
Reagan then stated what he was not prepared to do in any attempt to force South Africa to withdraw from Namibia; there were no circumstances in which he would agree to economic or military sanctions against South Africa. Though such action had long been demanded by black Americans, black Africans (and secretly by some whites in South Africa itself) it would be entirely counter-productive. It would increase support for the racists and zealots. It had to be remembered that John Vorster had fought and won his first election victory on the promise that he would be the one to stand up to the US. Worse still, sanctions would make even rational and moderate white South Africans believe that America was committed to destroying their country. The long and short of it was that no US action to force South Africa to withdraw had a chance of ending in anything but disaster for all involved unless a substantial majority of South Africans were convinced that the US would 'go all the way' to prevent a communist takeover of the Republic, by military force, if need be. And this was Reagan's "bottom-line position." He would insist on the freedom to tell South Africans of all races that America would fight to guarantee the Republic's existence while encouraging social reforms within the country.
To all but one of Reagan's many questions Casey supplied satisfactory answers. The unknown, and the unknowable, was the big one: how would South Africa ultimately react when it became clear that the US and the Soviet Union were actually prepared to use force to expel South African nationals from Namibia, and, perhaps launch a campaign to overthrow the white regime in Pretoria?
The CIA Directors best guess was that an easy majority of South Africans would, if push came to shove, be brought to their senses by the threat of join US-Soviet action once it was seen not to be a bluff; and that the door to successful Black Africa-South Africa negotiations would be opened. In this context a Presidential pledge that America would fight, if necessary to defend the Republic against communist aggression would have a great and good influence on South African public opinion. But there was no telling what a majority of white extremists might do to prevent an imposed solution.
And what if Pretoria itself rejected a joint US-Soviet ultimatum?
At the worst, South Africa would threaten a nuclear blitz. Casey did not himself think that Prime Minister Botha would really press the nuclear button---but they would have to work on the assumption that he would, and plan accordingly.
From Casey there'd been just one question. What if the Soviets agreed to play ball and their price was right? Could Reagan sell the deal? If the past was anything to go by, he would be stopped in his tracks by the NAACP lobby, by Congress, or both.
It was then that Reagan had produced his "secret weapon." It was a file some seven or eight inches thick. Inside its cover was a summary of the findings of a long-running survey of American public opinion. It showed that among white voters, who made up 90% and more of the electorate, opposition to South Africa's racial policies was growing by leaps and bounds. It had been since 1977, with the arrest and death of the activist Steven Biko. News of Biko's death spread quickly across the world, and became symbolic of the abuses of the apartheid system. His death attracted more global attention than he had ever attained during his lifetime. Protest meetings were held in several cities; many were shocked that the security authorities would kill such a prominent dissident leader. Biko's Anglican funeral service, held on September 25, 1977 at King William's Town's Victoria Stadium, took five hours and was attended by around 20,000 people. The vast majority were black, but a few hundred whites also attended. Foreign diplomats from thirteen nations were present, as was an Anglican delegation headed by Bishop Desmond Tutu. The event was later described as "the first mass political funeral in the country. Increasingly (in Western Europe as well as America) South Africa was being seen as a threat to world peace. And gaining ground among ordinary white voters was the belief that America and the West needed the gold and diamonds from South Africa more than South Africa needed the whites.
The implications were as obvious as they were profound. If South Africa continued to show only the uncompromising and ugly side of her nature to the world, she would lose the support of even the few friends she had in the world. And the day would come when public opinion would make it impossible for any American president to support any white-dominated government in South Africa, anti-communism notwithstanding.
With skillful use of the evidence that supported those conclusions Reagan was confident that he could win the support of "rational whites everywhere." He was, he told Casey, aware that the bigots and the zealots would condemn him as a traitor. They might even say "We re-elected Ronald Reagan and got Jimmy Carter!" But the verdict of history would be that this American president had brought peace to turbulent Southern Africa and saved South Africa from breaking with the West and becoming a bellicose extremist state living in hate and enmity with its neighbors as part of a crumbling Africa. To achieve that end, Reagan was prepared to give Casey a free hand "to negotiate with Soviet Russia or the devil himself."
At his first meeting with Tikhonov, Casey, trading on the knowledge that he was well respected in Moscow, went straight to the point. He was presuming, he told Tikhonov, that the Soviet Union and America had a common interest---to keep moderation alive in all of Africa. And that meant forcing South Africa to come to terms with the blacks before it was too late. If they failed, the whole region would be lost to the 'lunatic' forces of communism in one form or another. Uganda, for example, could fall to another bloodthirsty regime similar to that of the late Idi Amin. In that case Western interests would be so seriously threatened, and actually sabotaged, that the US and her Western allies would invade Africa. Such action would be folly (as the CIA had warned during the Angola crisis of 1975) because it would provoke more disasters than it would prevent. But politicians would not stop to think about the consequences of their words and deeds. In such a situation the US and the Soviet Union would most likely find themselves on a collision course.
The Americans, Casey said, were no under no illusions. An end to the South Africa vs. Black Africa conflict brought about by joint US-Soviet action would not bring peace and stability to the entire continent. Black regimes would continue to plot and scheme against each other, and play one superpower off against the other. But a settlement of the Apartheid problem that whites and blacks could live with would give the US and Soviet Union the best possible chance of successfully containing the threats to their mutual interests.
In reply, Tikhonov said he appreciated Casey's frankness and would play the game by the same rules. It was not their business to score propaganda points---that was a job for the diplomats; nor was it the time to do so. The situation for both sides was as critical as Casey had described it to be. But it had to be said that America was wholly to blame for what was happening. If the US had responded to the Soviet Union's many appeals for a more even-handed approach to the African problem, the Americans themselves, the Soviets, the black Africans and, yes, even the white South Africans would have been spared many of the agonies they had already suffered; and the continent and the world would not now be on the brink of catastrophe. The truth came down to this: the Americans had created a problem they could not solve, and now, in desperation, they had turned to the Soviets for help.
Casey had expected nothing less. It was, he guessed, Tikhonov's way of saying, "You've probably got a deal---but we'll make you pay."
In the detailed discussion that followed Tikhonov had focused his main concern on two issues.
What, in the American view, were the chances that the threat of joint US-Soviet action would be sufficient to persuade South Africa to come to terms with the blacks, and to end Apartheid at the conclusion of satisfactory peace talks with the ANC and the surrounding black African states? Was it, in other words, the American expectation that force would not have to be used?
Casey replied that his expectation was that US and Soviet forces would have to make a first-stage deployment to convince the South Africans that they were serious. He did not image that American and Soviet soldiers would have to set foot on South African or neighboring black soil.
In the Soviet view there was a more than 50-50 possibility that the South African government would threaten to launch a nuclear attack on black capitals if the American and the Soviets did not withdraw their ultimatum. It was also the Soviet view that the threat would not be a bluff it were made. Could the Americans guarantee that they would have sufficient "influence" in South Africa to reduce the possibility of a South African nuclear attack to an acceptable minimum?
Casey replied that he was working on the problem: but if he was being asked to guarantee that the risk could be reduced to zero, then the answer was "no."
When Casey went to East Berlin for follow-up discussions he was sure the Soviets would buy. Tikhonov more or less confirmed that impression. The question, as the KGB chairman hinted, was the price---the price the Soviets would ask for their cooperation, and the price the Americans were willing to pay for it.
At KGB headquarters in East Berlin, Tikhonov announced that the USSR was ready, in principle, to work with the Americans. There were two main conditions. The first was "non-negotiable" ; the second was "for discussion."
The first required the US to agree to the concept of removing Africa from the arena of traditional US-Soviet rivalry. What the USSR really wanted, Tikhonov explained, was to see Africa become, in effect, a "neutral zone," with neither the black states nor the whites being required to give allegiance to the two superpowers; and with neither the US nor the Soviet Union seeking to gain ground at the other's expense. In such a new arrangement the US and the Soviet Union would jointly guarantee the sovereignty of all states on the continent---South Africa included. By the same token the US and Soviet Union would share the responsibility for deterring further South African aggression.
It was, Tikhonov said, a brave and visionary concept that would need much work on both sides before it could become a reality. But the US would be required to commit itself to the idea in principle. Furthermore, the Soviet Union would insist that a declaration of intent was included in any joint US-Soviet statement announcing a new African peace offensive.
In addition, and to demonstrate its good faith, the US would be "invited" to give two further assurances. The first was that a joint CIA-KGB intelligence committee would be set up to monitor developments in Africa. It need not exist on paper. The second was that the US would use its influence to help the Soviet Union establish formal diplomatic relations with those black states which had hitherto been regarded as pro-Western.
Certain that the conversation was being transmitted "live" to Moscow. Casey's only comment was that it was for the black states themselves, who were independent and definitely not American satellites, to make their own decisions about the countries with whom they would enjoy formal diplomatic relations. American could not and would not seek to interfere in such a way. Tikhonov's response was that the Americans were being asked to refrain from interference of any kind.Then came the Soviet Union's second condition which, Tikhonov repeated, was not so much a condition as a subject for further discussion. (Casey noted that Tikhonov, at this point, was obviously embarrassed and gave the impression that he was speaking to order and against his better judgement.) The burden of what Tikhonov said, in a most vague manner, was that the day was coming when the Soviet Union would need to counter Chinese influence in Africa; and when that day came, the US would be expected to demonstrate an understanding of the Soviet position and action. In short, the US would be expected to allow the Soviet Union a free hand.
Casey's response was to the effect that he had not heard what Tikhonov had said.
On two other major topics---how to protect the rights of the few remaining white people in Zimbabwe and the status of Namibia---the two men did not spend much time. These were questions for others. It was acknowledged that the Mugabe regime did have the power and the influence to prevent a clear-cut victory for the ANC President, Oliver Tambo, and the moderates in any showdown between rival black tribes; but Tikhonov was reasonably confident that Namibia did not have to be an insurmountable obstacle. The ANC had given secret assurances (a fact confirmed by Tikhonov) that it would accept a multi-racial government in an independent Namibia. It could therefore remain open and undivided. The whites would insist on that and the ANC leadership was realistic enough to know that no power on earth could make them change their minds.
When the vodka was served Tikhonov asked Casey if he thought there was scope for a deal. Casey replied that he was just the messenger. But they drank a toast to US-Soviet cooperation in Africa.
The Casey-Tikhonov dialogue paved the way for action. In Washington, Reagan committed himself to a showdown with South Africa. In Africa, black leaders were approached and sounded out by senior officials from the State Department and the CIA and their Soviet counterparts. The Presidents of Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, and ANC President Tambo were the first to be put in the picture. But it was Tambo who was now regarded as America's most valuable asset in the region. And his role in the drama soon to unfold was critical.
According to the script written in Washington and approved with only minor changes in Moscow, Tambo was to respond to the joint US-Soviet declaration---scheduled for public announcement on December 10, 1985---with his most positive statement ever. In it he was not only to welcome the US-Soviet initiative and commit the ANC to immediate negotiations with South Africa; he was also required to indicate, in unambiguous language, that successful negotiations between black Africa and South Africa would lead to a de jure abolition of Apartheid in the country. It was also suggested to Tambo that it would be helpful if he could find a way to indicate that the ANC was ready to accept minor a few concessions in South Africa's favor.
It was to Casey that Oliver Tambo confirmed the outline of the speech he would make in response to the US-Soviet declaration; he was enthusiastic and excited---but also very worried: "You do realize, sir," he said, "that I may be signing my own death warrant."
With caution Casey suggested that he might like to take advantage of CIA protection. The Americans, it was implied, would go to any lengths to prevent him from being killed by black extremists who would reject compromise and whose aim was still the destruction of the White South.
Tambo's immediate response was a contemptuous glare which had given way to a sad smile. He could, he said, deal with his own extremists "when the time is right"---when he had something concrete to give his people to prove that politics and compromise did produce results. But his own extremists were not the problem; it was white extremism, as the more informed European correspondents had noted for some years. And it was not black extremism that South Africa's fanatics most feared. They had tanks and bombs for dealing with that. What really frightened South Africa's extremists was a moderate ANC ready to make peace with South Africa.
ANC leader Tambo turned and stood facing Casey: "What is South Africa's most likely response to the joint US-Soviet declaration and to my favorable reaction to it?" he asked, and answered his own question. "They will try to kill me. They are not stupid. They know that I am the only black leader who can hold our organization together and deliver compromise. Remember, please, these words. If the South Africans kill me they will win. And you Americans will once more find yourselves their servant. And then you will lose.
"You see, old boy, it is like this. If I am eliminated the black resistance movement will split. There will be a struggle for power, perhaps a civil war; the extremists will take over, and compromise will be rejected---by the ANC and, eventually, by those who will overthrow the moderate black regimes. And Western interests will be under attack from the Cape of Good Hope to the Horn of Africa.
"That, my friend, is the situation some whites will try to provoke in order to present South Africa as the only stable and civilized power on the continent---and therefore the best and sole defender of Western interests."
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At 5:30 p.m. Washington time on December 9, 1985, South Africa's ambassador, Johannes Albertus Hermanus Beukes, was summoned to the White House. A career diplomat would have flashed a standby warning message to Pretoria; an urgent "Come Now" summons to the White House was virtually unprecedented. It could only mean that something very dramatic had happened or was about to happen. Given the poor state of US-South African relations it was likely news that would be unwelcome in Pretoria. Personally, Beukes was deeply torn. He loathed the regime in South Africa, which he served only because his friend Mr. Vorster, the previous South African P.M., in his brief period of office had appealed to his patriotism as the one man whose historic connections with America would stop the US from ever abandoning South Africa. It was not, however, some sixth sense that was responsible for Beukes's failure to alert Botha. The summons to the White House had come from President Reagan himself, and he had asked the Ambassador to do him a favor---to refrain from communicating with Pretoria until after they had talked. Beukes had agreed. It was 30 minutes past midnight in South Africa and he could claim that he had not wished to wake PM Botha.
In the Oval Office, which was shortly to be the scene of a most extraordinary moment in the history of the Black Africa-South Africa conflict, Reagan and Beukes met as old friends. But it was Secretary of State George Shultz who spoke first and the tension he was obviously feeling did not allow him to do justice to his opening line that if South Africa's ambassador in Washington was any other man but Beukes, Reagan would have worn a bulletproof vest for the meeting!
They were all three standing in front of Reagan's desk.
"Johannes, I want you to convey the following message to your government."
Reagan's voice was quiet but firm.
"In one hour from now, and simultaneously in Washington and Moscow, there will be a statement. Your Prime Minister will regard it as an ultimatum; and he will be right. The statement will say that unless South Africa agrees to end Apartheid in one month, the United States and the Soviet Union will act together to impose a settlement. The same will apply if, within three more months the negotiations do not make solid progress towards the goal of granting Namibia independence---more or less---and the creation of a coalition government with Botswana."
Then came the unexpected.
Reagan and Beukes were not more than 18 inches apart. Beukes leaned forward and embraced Reagan.
Reagan struggled to keep his feelings under control. He succeeded by concentrating on the implications of what had just happened. For the first time ever he understood what a conflict of emotions he was about to provoke in South Africa. And for the first time in weeks he was truly frightened. On the good side there was Johannes Beukes whose basic human goodness was undoubtedly shared by the majority of his fellow whites in South Africa. Reagan was confident they could be reached by reasoned argument. On the bad side were the bigots and zealots whose minds were closed to reason. And the strength of their feelings was as great as Beukes's.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡrMrbW56RLu
George Shultz was also moved by the scene he had just witnessed. Beukes was clearly a man whose soul had been tortured by what the current South African government had done to demonstrate its complete contempt for the rights of others. How many more whites were being forced to live through the same private hell---ashamed by frightened to speak out? Schultz's answer to his own private question was "probably very many." There was hope in that hell.
When Beukes had finished reading through the text of the US-Soviet declaration, Reagan put the question: "Will we have to fight?"
Beukes's first observation was that in a rational world no 3rd country would be stupid enough to oppose both the United States and the Soviet Union. But the world was crazy; and the craziest people, in their present mood, were his fellow countrymen. He did not know the answer but his sad conclusion was that the moment of truth for his people had arrived. "Within a few days we whites will know what kind of people we are."
At 6:30 P.M. Washington time the NSA Communications Center at Fort Meade confirmed that Ambassador Beukes was in touch with Pretoria where it was 1:30 A.M. on the morning of December 10, 1985. Moscow was one hour ahead. In 30 minutes the text of the US-Soviet declaration was to be released to the world. In the next hour prime ministers, presidents and kings in capitals from Rome to New Delhi would be wakened from their slumbers. And the most influential of the Wester European leaders would receive a personal telephone call from the President of the United States. To each Reagan would explain why he had failed to consult his allies. He would say that total secrecy had been necessary in order for South Africa to be "totally shocked." And they would know that Reagan was not telling the whole truth and that the main reason for the secrecy had been the need to deny South Africa advance warning in order to prevent her government from making some outrageous threat and forcing Reagan into backing away from a showdown.
To British Prime Minister Thatcher----in the longest conversation---Reagan said he was learning to think like a South African. He was using on them the psychology they employed when dealing with terrorists who were holding hostages. Thus, if South Africa's leaders had not fired their nuclear missiles by breakfast time, they likely never would.
At 6:35 P.M. Washington time President Reagan (US) and Premier Chernenko (USSR) conferred briefly on the hotline. Reagan confirmed that Pretoria had been informed with only 30 minutes advance warning, as agreed. The Soviets had insisted on that.
Ten minutes later, Mr. Botha was demanding to be connected to the US President without delay. Reagan was ready, but he gave instructions for the call to be held. It was 13 minutes to zero hour and he had no intention of letting the South African leader capitalize on that curious fact to underline the prophecy of doom he was bound to make.
At 6:49 P.M. the Oval Office fell silent as Reagan signaled he was flicking the switch that would enable all those present to listen to the South African Prime Minister. Those now gathered around Reagan (as the video tape shows) included George Shultz (State), Casper Weinberger (Defense), William Crowe (Joint Chiefs of Staff), Charles H. Percy (Senate Foreign Relations Committee), William Casey (CIA), and William Webster (FBI).428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡ5XDNNIi9yc
Mr. Botha started with an announcement that he intended to come straight to the point. And to the apparent amazement of his White House listeners he did. It was that the US-Soviet ultimatum would be rejected by South Africa.
There was, Botha continued, no mortal power own earth which could force the whites to renounce their "God-given right to settle in a land they fought for and won." The world should know that the whites of South Africa were "just as African as the blacks"; it was not for the Americans or the Soviets or any others to demand the whites to abandon everything that they had built and everything that their ancestors had died for.
As for the security aspects and the question of South Africa's survival, these matters, Botha said, were no longer for discussion with an American Administration that was willing to force a "civilized white-ruled South Africa" to surrender itself to " the black barbarians." The specific demand that South Africa should negotiate with those who wished to destroy her was "so offensive to a proper Christian people" that it would be treated with the contempt it deserved.
In what seemed to his listeners to be a calculated change of mood, Botha then explained what he thought was the main reason for the "terrible misunderstanding" between South Africa and President Reagan. Reagan was a non-African; with the best will in the world it was therefore not possible for him to understand why the whites could never allow their fate to be determined by others. Maybe Reagan should take time off to study the stories and the pictures of the realities of life in black Africa, specifically the atrocities committed by dictators like Idi Amin, Jean Bokassa, etc..428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡvYWcS4XMyT
Reagan had earlier decided that he would not engage in debate with Botha unless he was challenged. The challenge had come; and to the surprise of his White House audience Reagan met it head on.
In recent weeks, he said, he had indeed studied the history of Africa in great depth; and he had discovered in his research that there had been a plan to create a greater South Africa at the expense of the blacks, a plan that had been a motivating force long, long before the start of the Cold War. In the 1920s, the white zealots had talked openly of expansion and crushing any and all black opposition by force. So there was, Reagan said, another conclusion to be drawn: that the fearsome reputation of the black Africans had been "used to further the colonial ambitions of zealots." And those zealots were men who had "ruthlessly exploited the unimaginable sufferings of their fellows for political ends."428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡVWgb3EuUOL
The voice from Pretoria was calm. "I think, Mr. Reagan, that you really are determined to have a showdown with my country."
The voice from Washington was equally calm. "Yes, Mr. Botha, with your government."
"Then I hope you understand, Mr. Reagan, that the road you are taking may lead to World War III."
To those at the Washington end what happened next was not entirely unexpected. On the words "World War III" Reagan switched off his telephone and turned in anger to the Secretary of State: "George, I'll continue to follow your advice. I'll keep my cool. But I'll tell you this: right now that son-of-a-bitch in Pretoria is lucky we don't have nuclear missiles targeted on his home!"428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡVOMIgV273M
Schultz's response was a tight smile and a cue card. On it were the words "Choice---South African democracy."
Reagan nodded, switched on the phone again and calmly argued that since South Africa was a democracy its government had an obligation to consult the people on so grave an issue before a final decision was taken. Would Botha give an assurance that the people would be consulted?
The reply from Pretoria was that South African leaders were not accountable to Washington for the way they conducted their political affairs.
Still on the President's desk was the thick file he called his secret weapon. It was time for Prime Minister Botha to be informed of its existence and its implications. The problem was how to present its message---that the day was coming when American public opinion would no longer permit their President to guarantee South Africa's survival---without it sounding like a threat, and thus fulfilling the white expectation of persecution. Reagan gave only brief extracts from the opinion polls, but in summing up he said that the evidence, if made public, would prove that he had acted to protect the Republic of South Africa.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡIDlLLZ730d
When there was no immediate response from Pretoria Reagan said a copy of the file would reach PM Botha within hours. It was hoped that he and his colleagues would study it carefully before deciding on their future course of action.
The exchange ended with the minimum of courtesy on both sides; and Schultz observed that it was the first time to his knowledge that any South African leader had failed to begin and end a conversation with the word "Hallo." But what he did not say out loud was that it was not the first time he had seen President Reagan so forceful, well-informed and effective in a solo exchange with another head of state.
At 6:50 p.m. Reagan remarked that the heat in the kitchen was about to become intense.
At 6:59 P.M. Reagan nodded to Larry Speakes, the White House Press Secretary: "Go tell the world, Larry." Within a few seconds of his dramatic reading of the text of the US-Soviet declaration, the wire services of the international news agencies were flashing the first headlines around the world. UPI's first snap was: "US-Soviet Ultimatum to South Africa---Change or we'll fight." The second: "Namibia to be granted independence." The third: "America and USSR to guarantee South Africa's survival." In the excitement and turmoil of the White House press room Larry had written a headline of his own for President Reagan. It said: "They're with us. You'll carry the country!"428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡRFTXLjHQXt
In the Oval Office, at 7:00 on the dot, President Reagan instructed his crisis management team: "Go for Beachcomber." That was the code name for an operation that placed America's already overburdened security services on a Red Alert for white extremists. It was taken for granted that there would be a white terror campaign.
FBI Director Webster asked for clarification of the ground rules to be applied during telephone tapping. Reagan's response was immediate and firm. Apart from the taps already agreed on a small number of known white-supremacist groups, decisions were to be made by the proper authorities on a case by case basis, and no action was to be contemplated without "good evidence." Then, in a short off-the-cuff address to those gathered around him, Reagan set out what he called his overall policy guidelines.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡD5dGN6lKh5
"When the history of this night and these days comes to be written, let it be boldly said that we acted with clean hands and with the most noble intentions. We are up against a man who claims to have God on his side, and who usually behaves as if he were God. I want the world to know that we acted with right on our side and in the name of peace."428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡK7k8GsBwiw
Between 7:10 P.M. and 7:30 P.M. three former U.S. Presidents, Nixon, Ford, and Carter, telephoned the White House to offer their support. The press statement announcing this had, in fact, been drafted three days earlier. It was stage management of the highest order, but with a clear objective in mind. From the outset it had been agreed that for President Reagan to have the best possible chance of persuading the people of South Africa to compromise, he would need to demonstrate that all of America was behind him.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡ5PkbzXRNvr
At 7:40 p.m. London confirmed to Washington that SAS units had supplemented the defense of key ports along the African coast, specifically Mombasa, Alexandria and Tangier.
There was nothing official from Pretoria except a brief holding statement which said there would be no official reaction from South Africa until PM Botha had consulted his Cabinet colleagues.
The reaction from the leaders of Africa, which trickled in throughout the night, was much as it had been expected in Washington. Their message, mainly for internal consumption, was to the effect that they were winning. In deciding at last to insist on a measure of justice for an oppressed people, "the twin powers of white imperialism" were bowing to the inevitable. It was dramatic proof that Africans could free themselves from Western and Soviet exploitation provided they kept up the pressure and were prepared to take all necessary steps to confront the imperialists. 428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡoqd906HDwz
The first official black response to the US-Soviet ultimatum was from Oliver Tambo, in Dar-es-Salaam at the time. His statement said that the ANC was ready, in association with the black states concerned, to enter into immediate negotiations with South Africa. It also said that the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and justice for the black majority was compatible with South Africa's needs for security. On this Tambo would have more to say during a major speech in Angola in three days' time. The impression given was that this speech would contain good news for those white South Africans who were prepared to live in peace with the black majority.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡgbGmIB5ijg
As a gesture to the minority of hardliners on the ANC Executive Committee the Chairman had apparently refrained from saluting the wisdom of the leaders of the two superpowers. Though still committed to their leader's moderation, the more radical leaders were anxious to avoid saying anything that would lay them open to a charge from the Marxists that they were selling their souls to the enemies of the Marxist revolution.
The ultimatum provoked agonized debates in the capitals of all the black states. By midnight Washington time the moderates---led by Zaire, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Malawi---had agreed their response. It was clear that the blacks had (with one exception) come off the fence: if South Africa accepted the ANC as a full negotiating partner, the moderate black states were ready to go to the conference table without delay. The black responses also left no room for doubt that if South Africa went into the talks with the "right attitude," she could emerge from them with their right to conduct their own affairs recognized.
The exception was Angola. The statement from Luanda on December 10, 1985 said that while Angola was not opposed in principle to the idea of a just and comprehensive peace, it was not confident that the Americans and the Soviets would back their words with deeds. Angola's response would therefore be determined by events. Luanda, in other words, was keeping its options open.
President Reagan still had (as he put it himself) "two more hands to play."
The first was to appeal to the people of South Africa over the head of their government without appearing to be doing so. In an ideal situation Reagan would make a reassuring statement as a spontaneous reply to an unexpected question. White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes was an expert at this kind of media management.
When Reagan arrived in the White House press room a few minutes after midnight (breakfast time in South Africa), he was appearing on the understanding that there would be no questions. The situation, Speakes had said when arranging the deal, was much too delicate for speculation; and Reagan would make only the briefest of statements. It was to be regarded as more of a photocall. In fact, Reagan was aware of a particular question that he would be asked and that he would answer. He knew, too, who'd ask it.
His brief statement over and his thanks to the press for their understanding delivered, Reagan was on his way out of the press room when the booming voice of CNN's Washington correspondent, Wolf Blitzer, caused him to pause.
"Mr. President, an anxious nation is entitle to the answer to one particular question."
With surprise and an innocent curiosity written all over his aged face President Reagan turned back to face the correspondents and the cameras.
"Yes, Mr. Blitzer?"
"Mr. President, do you think a military confrontation with South Africa is inevitable---given the known attitudes of its government?"
Secretary Speakes intervened as if to hustle the President away. His performance was equal to that of his boss. The President shrugged him off.
"Mr. Blitzer, for once you are right. Ladies and gentlemen, I will answer that question."
Then, and live to many nations, South Africa included at breakfast-time, the President delivered what was in fact his appeal for common sense to prevail in the white-ruled African nation. At the start of his well-rehearsed answer he was the world's leading statesman talking to the world. The brunt of his opening remarks was that a military confrontation was the most unlikely scenario because the overwhelming majority of South African's whites would soon realize that they were being offered true security for the first time in their history. Then, and as the CNN camera feeding the satellite transmission to South Africa zoomed slowly into closeup, Reagan eased himself into his best fireside chat manner, his every word aimed at his audience in South Africa.
When Reagan was later informed that not all of his message had been received in South Africa, he cursed and wondered why it was that Americans could put a men on the moon but not guarantee satellite transmissions to South Africa. Reagan exploded. Was he trying to tell him that Botha had pulled the plug?
Speakes's answer was that P.M. Botha was apparently in some trouble because many of his people believed that was what had happened. But on this occasion Mr. Botha was not guilty of any treachery. When asked by Reagan to explain what had happened, Speakes suggested that CIA Director Casey was likely better qualified to give the answer, adding that Casey's plan was to kill two birds with one stone---to get the essential part of Botha's message over, and then have Botha blamed for, in effect, censoring President Reagan. How, Reagan had asked, could Casey's boys have known when to pull the plug? That, Larry said, was easy. They'd worked on the script of Reagan's spontaneous reply to an unexpected question. And that in turn was why the final two paragraphs of it would normally have been deleted by any self-respecting White House Press Secretary.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡzz3TOPeBxl
On December 10, 1985, at 1:45 A.M., Reagan made the brief journey from the White House to the main conference room in the Watergate Hotel complex to play his second hand. Assembled there, in a state of acute shock and confusion, were 500 of America's most powerful and influential white conservative leaders. Within minutes of the release of the text of the US-Soviet declaration Reagan had been informed by Senator Robert Byrd that an emergency meeting was being arranged. Reagan had also been assured that responsible American conservative leaders would make no public statements, official or unofficial, until they had heard from the President himself. (This, in effect, was conservative America's way of summoning the President.)
Byrd was assigned to be the reception committee at the Watergate. When Reagan had asked about the meeting's mood, Byrd had replied: "All I can say, Mr. President, is that there has been no talk of a lynching party---yet."
Reagan's response was gentle but firm. In the next hour they were going to decide who made U.S. foreign policy for Africa---the Government of South Africa and its supporters in white America, or the President and his Administration in the name of all the people of the United States.
Byrd had received reports that Reagan was a changed man and that there was no way he was going to allow himself to be outmaneuvered by Pretoria and its supporters in America; but the Senator was still shocked by Reagan's vigor and confidence.
Behind closed doors Reagan then revealed the contents of the file he called his secret weapon. To this audience what mattered most were the details of the confidential opinion polls which told of the erosion of support for a white-ruled South Africa among the majority of non-white Americans.
The essence of Reagan's case was that he had acted in concert with the Soviet Union to save South Africa from herself. If South Africa were allowed to continue to obstruct the quest for peace through compromise, the day would come when no American president would have the freedom to do what was needed to guarantee her survival. It was possible, he said, that he might be the last American president who could make a promise that would be honored. And on that basis he was seeking the support of responsible whites everywhere.
Reagan sat down to what he later described as "the most complete silence" he had ever experienced. It lasted for nearly a full minute. Then a man in the second row rose to his feet with his hands outstretched. Six other hands went for their guns---but the man, a banker from New York, was clapping. In ones and twos to begin with, and then in tens and twenties, the others followed until a great majority of America's most influential whites were on their feet---applauding the man who had that night read the riot act to the racist state. Reagan told himself he was witnessing a miracle.
A subsequent canvas of those attending the Watergate meeting showed that Reagan's most persuasive point had been his assertion that a continued South African refusal to compromise would lead, eventually, to a new era of Nazism, and his implied warning that the whites of America and Western Europe could lose everything if they did not now involve themselves in the struggle to contain and defeat the excesses of militant white nationalism.
Reagan responded to the applause by urging American conservative leaders to translate their support for his approach into positive and urgent action. There were to priorities. It was essential that South Africa be left in no doubt about the views of American conservative leaders. It was equally essential for the same views to be transmitted without delay to white lobbies and communities throughout the world. What Reagan said he really wanted was a sustained and coordinated campaign by white people everywhere to support and encourage the moderates in South Africa in the most obvious way, and that such action would be condemned by the government and extremists in that country. But they had no choice.
From the floor of the conference hall Senator Byrd then rose to speak. He wished to imply no disrespect to Reagan, and broadly speaking he did not object to what the President was asking of them, but he was, he said, deeply troubled. It was a well-known fact that the more Mr. Botha felt himself being driven into a corner, the more likely he was to respond with spectacular and desperate action. Since Mr. Botha had a nuclear button of his own, could it not be said that too much outside pressure---especially from non-South African whites---would persuade him to press it?
"That," said a bone-weary Reagan, "is the risk facing all Mankind."428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡHnWn6WvBZf
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In South Africa itself there was a surface calm on the morning of December 10, 1985 which seemed to give the lie to those observers who had long predicted that the day the US read the riot act to the racist state would mark the beginning of its descent into civil war. True it was that South African public opinion divided along familiar lines in its first emotional response to the US-Soviet ultimatum; but it was all talk. Supporters of the government denounced the US for its betrayal and assumed that the ultimatum would be rejected. Supporters of the main opposition party, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) said they did not see that South Africa had any choice but to accept it; she could not fight one superpower, let alone two.
The main reason for this calm was undoubtedly Mr. Botha's cool performance on South African television that morning. He had appeared briefly at 10:00 and in a quiet, confident voice he had urged his people to refuse to be panicked or provoked. He said he was himself setting the example he wanted all to follow, and, as proof that he was taking his own advice, he would refrain from commenting on the US-Soviet ultimatum until he had consulted all shades of opinion. By late evening in South Africa speculation focused on one question. What, really, was P.M. Botha up to? For two more days the world was kept in suspense.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡIz2FqaStmC
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At 10:15 on the morning of December 13, 1985, the ANC leader, Oliver Tambo, left Dar-es-Salaam and went south to address a rally and make his major statement to South Africa. He was accompanied by two personal bodyguards, traveling in a green Peugeot. The lead vehicle, flying the ANC flag, was a sand-colored Volkswagen minibus. In it were five heavily-armed guerillas. The tail was an open-topped truck with machine-guns mounted on either side---two gunners and six more guerillas.
The ANC convoy was ambushed one mile north of the point where the road to Kidatu runs through the Mikumi National Park---just fifteen minutes from the place where Tambo was to have made his speech. It was all over in seconds. The three vehicles were hit by anti-tank rockets. The debris, when it settled, was scattered over an area of several hundred yards.
The Angolans didn't hold up the news. By noon the world had been informed that the ANC ambassador had been killed in an ambush to South African commandos.
By 12:30 p.m., the Presidents of Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe had agreed to convene an emergency OAU summit in Kenya for that evening. Present Kaunda (whose telephone calls were monitored by South African intelligence) said that if they did not take a lead they would all be "living in America within the week---if we last that long."
At 1:00 South African PM Botha went on television and radio to announce what he said was his government's first formal response to the US-Soviet ultimatum. But he said that he would start by confirming that South African forces had that morning struck "the greats possible blow for peace and stability in Southern Africa." Botha did not attempt to disguise his sense of triumph and joy at this assassination. "The man who devoted his whole life to exterminating Whites is now himself exterminated. For the children of this land, it is a profoundly significant moment. They need no longer be haunted by the fear of a reverse genocide." But it was also a moment of great significance for the black nations, for they, too, had been "liberated" by South Africa's action of the morning. The dead man, Oliver Tambo, Botha asserted, was not merely Africa's "number one terrorist," he was also Africa's "number one blackmailer"; for years he had prevented some black governments from acting in their own best interests. To those governments and to our friends in Zambia in particular, I extend once again the hand of friendship."
Botha then announced his willingness to open immediate talks with any black state on a "government-to-government basis." This was Botha's way of saying he would not speak with the ANC which was an illegal organization.
On the subject of the US-Soviet ultimatum the South African leader was brief. He was sure that the President of the United States and the Premier of the USSR would understand that a new situation now existed in Africa. It was impossible for him to believe that the superpowers would fail to see why they now needed a South Africa that was "more vigorous than ever" to help defend and protect their interest against their enemies in Africa. He was therefore calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to withdraw their ultimatum and to act quickly to help bring about negotiations between South Africa and black Africa.
The broadcast was watched in Lusaka by Kaunda, who was beginning a meeting with his military commanders. He informed them that the situation in Namibia, specifically the region called the Caprivi Strip, was deteriorating: the ANC had already extended its hand to the South African Prime Minister---but they were hands filled with gasoline bombs and stones. Kaunda said it was his expectation, reinforced by the broadcast, that the South Africans would launch a dawn offensive on the pretext of restoring law and order to Namibia, but their intention would be to "de-black" Namibia as a prelude to formal annexation. Kaunda then asked his commanders to ready battle plans for review in two hours. "We have talked so much about negritude. We must now act in its name."
As the officers were rising to leave, Kaunda's private secretary rushed into the room.
"Your Excellency, I have a message from the American ambassador. I wrote down his exact words."
There were seven words scrawled on the sheet with the presidential monogram: "Tambo alive and well. Trust us."
One hour after Botha's public pronouncement Tambo made a dramatic reappearance at a press conference south of Brazzaville---to deliver his promised statement to South Africa and to eulogize the 19 blacks who had been killed in the morning ambush.
A man called Perez Kamari---a shoemaker and a father of 8 children---was named as his double and stand-in. Kamari, Tambo said, was "the bravest black man who ever lived." When he had set out from Dar-es-Salaam that morning he had known there was a 99% chance that he would not return alive. By his death he had proved again to the world that South Africa's current leaders were incapable of dealing with political problems by political means.
Then he came to the heart of his message to South Africa. It was, he said, on the political front that it was a "genuine misunderstanding" to be cleared up. Insofar as there was a real obstacle to peace on the blacks' side it was their failure, to date, to say publicly what they meant by the word "interim." (Until this moment all ANC statements and speeches had referred to the mini-state concept as an "interim solution".) This failure to say what they meant had given some credibility to the claims of successive South African governments that the ANC was intent on the liquidation of white rule.
The explanation of what the ANC meant by the word interim was brief and to the point---and was to provide the serious newspapers of the West with their lead story for the day. The word was used, and would continue to be used, to indicate that the blacks, while agreeing to a political settlement, were not intending to abandon their dream that South Africa would day be a solidly black state. The blacks never could and never would abandon that objective. But (the most important "but" in the history of the Black-Africa-vs.-South-Africa conflict) the blacks were now saying they accepted that Africa could become monoracial "only by political means---that is, with the consent of the whites." To that end the blacks would insist that their right to advocate, and work for, the eventual liberation of South Africa, "by all peaceful and political means," would be enshrined in any peace treaty with South Africa.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡMaJWininzp
Within hours President Reagan and Premiere Chenenko issued statements welcoming this "most positive contribution to the search for peace." And in a Washington follow-up Secretary Shultz said that South Africa no longer had an excuse to refuse direct negotiations with the ANC. Similar views were expressed by leaders throughout Western Europe.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡUGxLl8zFjC
Nobody from the South African government was available for comment.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡpVmkV0pKcN
That the ANC statement had made a favorable impression in South Africa was confirmed by the findings of Compoll published in the Star on December 16, 1985. According to the poll, 67% of all South Africans were in favor of their government having "talks about talks" with the ANC.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡ6vZdp1AfpR
That was one face of a deeply divided nation. The other was reflected on South African television that same night in a filmed report from South Africa's illegal settlements in Namibia, south of the Zambian border. The message were clear. The settlers were digging in to fight all-comers, including their own government if need be. Unwanted reporters and camera crews, South Africans included, were kept away from the settlements at gunpoint.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡnOTuFNzQ0F
The report from northern Namibia was followed by a newsflash announcing that the main office of the Star had been fire-bombed by a militant group calling itself the APL (Afrikaanse Proteksionistiese Liga). Its leader was said to be a former South African minister of defense.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡ2GP5DL1Y82
The following morning the Star's front page editorial was headlined: "The Nazis are back in business? So what else is new?" The editorial went on to say that what was new was that white supremacists were now killing their fellow whites.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡ4I73yhU4lO
Reagan would never know that Oliver Tambo had lied to him until it was too late.428Please respect copyright.ＰＥＮＡＮＡYqv2fvLVF6
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